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Women’s Rights in India:  




The recent debates on sexual violence in India have brought to light 
the deeply entrenched hierarchical ideas about gender roles in Indian 
society and underlying social norms. Since the brutal gang-rape and 
subsequent death of Jyoti Singh Pandey, a 23 year old paramedical 
student, on 16 December 2012 in Delhi, the situation of women in 
India is under the spotlight of international public attention. In India 
itself the problem is evident since many years. Rape is one among the 
many terrifying dimensions of systemic disabilities that Indian women 
face – as women. As Anderson and Ray have established in a recent 
study (Anderson & Ray 2012: 87-95), about two million women go 
missing in India every year due to prenatal sex selection (Raju & 
Lahiri-Dutt 2011: 212), killing of new-born girl-children (Choudhry 
2011), malnutrition of adolescent girls (Mehotra 2006), dowry murders 
(Oldenburg 2010) and other misogynist practices. Rape cases regis-
tered by the National Crime Records Bureau have “increased by almost 
900 per cent over the past 40 years, to 24,206 incidents in 2011, while 
murder cases had gone up by only 250 percent over 60 years, and 
incidences of riot had actually dropped.”2 
This article deals with the ambivalences in the normative make-up 
of the Indian polity that contribute to ambivalent attitudes toward 
rape. Unlike more simple and homogeneous European societies, Indian 
society is governed by a bewildering multiplicity of normative systems, 
legal and para-legal, that tend to conflict with and undercut each 
other. On the one hand there is the constitutional legal framework that 
grants equal liberties to all citizens; on the other hand there is a 



























with the legal framework. The phenomenon of legal pluralism in the 
case of India is well studied by legal anthropologists (Bavinck et al. 
2011). In this article, the notion of normative pluralism is expanded to 
include normative bodies beyond the law, i.e. social norms, ethical 
codes etc. 
 Social norms governing Indian society are of course not uniform as 
India is a society of many diverse communities, each with their own 
common law. As much as these norms can vary from community to 
community, they also seem to converge on a large number of points. 
Especially the norms regulating the conduct of gender in public seem 
to be largely shared between communities. Special attention will be 
given to those aspects of social norms that appear to be common 
among the communities. Most Indian communities whether urban, 
rural or tribal, tend to agree grosso modo that a woman’s place is 
primarily at home and not in the public square. If she has to venture 
out, then preferably during daytime and dressed in ‘modest’ clothes. 
Ideally she would be accompanied by another member of the family 
who can act has her ‘guardian’. As will be shown, failure to abide by 
these norms can lead to punitive acts, sometimes taking the form of 
sexualised violence. To the extent that these acts of violence are seen 
as a justified social reaction in the name of customary law, such ideas 
of non-codified law can undercut codified law even in the established 
courts of India in ways that will become clear in the discussion below. 
 Confronted with the hiatus between social norms predominant in 
society and the egalitarian moral demands enshrined in the consti-
tution, the Indian women’s rights movement is faced with the problem 
of devising strategies to break the hegemony of the conservative 
discourse on the role of women in society. To better understand the 
mode of critique put forth by women’s rights activists and feminists, 
the three-pronged terminology put forth by Rahel Jaeggi in her Kritik 
von Lebensformen (2014) where she differentiates between ‘external’, 
‘internal’ and ‘immanent’ critique, will be analysed. These considera-
tions are brought to bear on the notion of citizenship, among others, 
as discussed in Indian feminism. Indian feminists have criticised the 
methodological individualism inherent in the Western understanding of 
the unmarked citizen. The attempt to reformulate citizenship as a no-
tion differentiated by communal and gender identities, however, raises 
concerns about the unity and strength of the women’s movement to 




























 Viewed from the perspective of moral philosophy, the problem 
facing progressive women in India is similar to the dilemma facing 
Universalist moral philosophy in general. Before belief in the equal 
dignity of all human beings, irrespective of gender, class or caste, is 
not wide spread, universal human rights remain an aspiration, not an 
achievement. What is therefore called for is an emergentic theory of 
human rights universalism. Rahel Jaeggi, who resorts to ideas of forms 
of life already present in the work of Jürgen Habermas, may be 
offering the tools to elucidate the circumstances of such an emer-
gence. Although formally upholding his claims to the universal validity 
of moral norms, Habermas concedes that prior to its establishment 
Universalist morality depends on accommodating life worlds; it 
relies on a certain amount of conformity with practices of 
socialization and education […] on a certain degree of conformity 
with political and social institutions which already epitomise post-
conventional ideas of morality and law. (1985: 25, my 
translation, emphasis in original) 
The point of this paper is to see what philosophical and social critique 
can do in case these accommodating life worlds are not forthcoming. 
Habermas reminds us that “The incremental incorporation of moral 
principles in concrete life-forms […] is chiefly owed to the collective 
efforts and sacrifices of social and political movements” (ibid.) – from 
within these societies themselves, as we might add. In situations 
where hierarchy prevails over equality, we have to wait for social and 
political movements to bring about conditions suitable for Habermas’ 
post-conventional consciousness to arise on a broad scale. Only then 
can we engage in a wide-ranging social discourse about justice which 
may lead to the emergence of universal moral principles.  
As we will see, the diagnosis of a possible asynchrony in the make-
up of the normative framework provides a leaver for social movements 
like the Indian women’s movement to employ what Jaeggi has termed 
‘immanent critique’. The efficacy of immanent critique, however, 
depends on the capacity of the critique to analytically expose the con-
tradictions that are constitutive of Indian society without itself getting 
entangled in them. The paper will show that feminist critique in India 
does not always succeed in escaping those entrapments. 
Women’s Rights: Social and Legal Norms 
Three disclaimers beforehand: The reconstruction of the representa-



























gender, are bound to be gross simplifications. Every historical period, 
every region, every caste, every religion, every tribe, even every 
family has different ideas about what women and men should do or 
not do. Moreover, social norms are not necessarily codified in writing. 
Customs and manners are handed down orally and they may be 
interpreted differently by every individual or group of individuals. Thus 
nowhere is this reconstruction meant to abet an essentialist, ahistorical 
view of society, particularly in view of the fact that Indian society is 
presently experiencing processes of rapid change. Therefore, this can 
only be a snapshot in time and a sweep across important differences. 
All we can derive from it are generic propositions and no universally 
valid statements. 
 The second disclaimer concerns the position of the author. How can 
a Westerner, particularly a male one, make common cause with the 
Indian women’s movement? Is the author not bound to be caught up 
in the existing power relations, which would only reveal his hetero-
nomy? (Spivak 1985: 336, 363) Is he not just going to project his own 
agenda into the ‘other’ when speaking about her? The risk is that the 
author uses his position to lend his own voice to the ‘other’, whom he 
construes to suit his own projects and projections. As I do not believe 
that an Archimedean theoretical position exists from which this prob-
lem could be avoided, the best the author can do is to try to reflect 
and render transparent the reasons behind his own interest in this 
engagement. To quote a famous passage of Gayatri Spivak’s “Can the 
Subaltern Speak”: The task is “not to represent (vertreten) them but 
to learn to represent (darstellen) ourselves” (Spivak 1988: 288-89). 
The engagement should not lead to a supersession of the voice of the 
‘other’ and to an usurpation of her position. An integral part of the me-
thodology is therefore to give her as much room as possible for self-
articulation through interviews and other texts to avoid the ‘fixation of 
the other’ (Fuchs 1999: 156). 
 Third, the focus on controversies about patriarchal norms in India is 
not to divert attention from the fact that similar patriarchal norms exist 
in other countries including the West, where falling birth rates give tail 
wind to conservative policies in family politics and some of the same 
stereotypes and biases vis-à-vis women inform the police force and the 
judiciary.3 Patriarchal structures everywhere in the world fail to treat 
women as ‘ends in themselves,’ as Kant’s categorical imperative would 
demand it. Instead they treat them as mere means to an end, which 
more often than not boils down to the preservation of the honour of 



























does not serve the individual woman in question. Women are treated 
as custodians for the honour of their family, tribe or caste. In extreme 
cases, they symbolically, albeit literally, pay with their lives for it.4 
 The archetypical ordeal that women have to undergo as custodians 
of family honour is Sita’s: “Sita had to prove her chastity, after being 
rescued from Lanka, through trial by fire, but still had to be abandoned 
by her Lord because she was not above suspicion in the eyes of at 
least one subject in his kingdom”.5 According to Sudhir Kakar, how-
ever, Indian patriarchy is distinct from its counterparts elsewhere in 
that it strips women, as women, of personhood and reduces them to 
an object of pleasure for men: “In a society that has traditionally 
defined a person through her relationships rather than her individual-
ity, a woman is certainly a person when she is a mother, a daughter, a 
sister or a wife. Any woman who does not fit into these mental catego-
ries, is a female, a stree, a bhog ki cheez” [an object of enjoyment].”6 
Hierarchical Ethics 
As many feminists deplore, the debates on gender equity of the last 
decades have not been able to displace the patriarchal discourse of 
mainstream society. Ratna Kapur regrets that “despite the legal 
victories over the years, the social, political, and economic status of 
women has shown remarkably little improvement” (Kapur 2012: 341). 
Invariably, amendments to the law are either half-hearted or watered 
down, or their sting is taken out by the judiciary in their patriarchal 
interpretation of the law. Feminists have realised that any legal 
discourse is embedded in the larger ethical discourse from which it 
receives basic notions and stereotypical representations of gender 
roles that help to distort the spirit of the law in the processes of 
application and enforcement. The patriarchal nature of the dominant 
discourse on gender can be detected from the discourse on sexual 
violence, which is fraught with patriarchal notions of shame and 
honour right up to the top of the legislative, the executive and the 
judiciary; notions of honour of which invariably women are the cus-
todians (Kapur 2012; Menon 2004: Ch. 3). In this imaginary, women 
are represented as passive, penetrable, and therefore easy to victimise 
and not as active, pleasure seeking, and autonomous human beings. 
 For the purpose of this paper, the tentative reconstruction of the 
ideas that dominate representations of social order in India relies on 
two non-representative surveys carried out by the Tehelka magazine, 



























Region (Balla & Vishnu 2013), and secondly among 35 Indian men, 
randomly chosen from different social strata, age groups and regions 
of India (Chaudhury 2013). Tehelka’s managing editor Shoma Chau-
dhury asks in the issue of 19 January 2013: “What creates the idea of 
women as ‘fair game’ for sexual violence? What, in effect, do Indian 
men think about women?” (ibid.) The short answer is that most Indian 
men generally do not hold the male side responsible when it comes to 
rape. Out of the 35 respondents, only seven younger men aged 
between 23 and 29 thought that men share a responsibility in cases of 
rape. 
 It is as if Manu’s law was still very present in the collective un-
conscious of large sections of Indian society. According to Article 147 
of the Manusmriti, a woman should never be outside the custody of a 
male family member: “By a girl, by a young woman, or even by an 
aged one, nothing must be done independently, even in her own 
house” (Bühler 1886: Article 147). Terms used today vary according to 
community and region. A woman is seen as the property of her future 
in-laws (Hindi: paraya dhan). Until marriage she is under the pro-
tection of her family (Hindi/Urdu: hifazat, Bhojpuri: rakhval, cf. the 
Bhojpuri-song in Jassal 2012: 8-9). The Hindi/Urdu term ‘amanat’ 
refers to the mutual obligation of trust in a hierarchical relationship 
(Rajshree Chandra, CSDS Fellow, interviewed on 27 May 2013). This 
illustrates that the dependency of women on the men of the family, 
and their lack of autonomy is considered the norm in Indian society. 
 The responses obtained by Tehelka, some of them quoted below, 
nurture the impression that these ancient norms persist in some minds 
and thereby seem to defeat history. After marriage, the guardianship 
of the parents is replaced by that of the husband’s family. Article 138 
of the Manusmriti says: “In childhood a female must be subject to her 
father, in youth to her husband, when her lord [her husband] is dead 
to her sons; a woman must never be independent” (ibid.). Today 
parents tell their children: “Till you marry, you are my responsibility” 
(Sharmistha Saha, PhD candidate in Theater Studies, interviewed on 
19 May 2013). As the Manusmriti emphasises, “She must not seek to 
separate herself from her father, husband, or sons; by leaving them 
she would make both (her own and her husband’s) families contempt-
ible.” (ibid. Article 149) Vicariously, brothers or other male members of 




























 The system of mutual obligations in the name of their community’s 
honour (maryada, cf. Bajpai 2013: 4) that both sexes have towards 
each other is metaphorically described as a boundary (Lakshman 
rekha) that they, particularly women, must not overstep so as not to 
imperil social order. “If girls don’t stay within their boundaries, if they 
don’t wear appropriate clothes, then naturally there is attraction. This 
attraction makes men aggressive, prompting them to just do it” (Sub-
Inspector Arjun Singh, SHO Surajpur Police Station, Greater Noida, cit. 
in Balla & Vishnu 2013). A woman, who oversteps her boundaries for 
example by moving in public unaccompanied by her guardian, is to 
blame herself if anything happens to her, as women’s rights activist 
Flavia Agnes explains: “[W]omen who dare to cross the boundaries 
[...] are seen as ‘free for all’ or rather, everyone thinks that they are 
the custodians of women’s morality and that they have a right to 
‘teach them a lesson’” (Agnes 2013: 13). She risks being perceived as 
a ‘loose girl’ whom anyone can abuse with righteousness. Rape, 
particularly, is not an offence in such a case as a woman outside her 
boundary is equated to a prostitute. 
 This view again has an earlier avatar in a social norm from a Muslim 
society cited in ‘Abd al-Qadir Bada’uni’s sixteenth century chronicle 
where it says that “if a young women were found running about the 
lanes and bazars of the town, and while so doing either did not veil 
herself, or allowed herself to become unveiled, or if a woman was 
worthless and deceitful and quarrelled with her husband, she was to go 
to the quarter of the prostitutes, and take up the profession” (Lowe 
1884: 405). Again the impression is that such ancient norms persist in 
some minds even today. The extant perception is that the rape of a 
prostitute constitutes no offence but rather “a deal gone sour” to quote 
Trinamul Congress leader Kakoli Ghosh Dastidar’s remark in connec-
tion with the Kolkata Park Street rape case of 5 February 2012.7 
 Tehelka’s study does not allow us to decide whether such ana-
chronistic representations are mere coincidences or whether they do 
point to an existing asynchrony in the normative imaginary of Indian 
society. Quite anachronistic, however, is the fact that to date marital 
rape does not constitute a legal offence in India. Even though the 
Justice Varma Committee Report had demanded marital rape to be 
explicitly banned (Government of India 2013) the Criminal Law 
Amendment promulgated on 3 February 2013 has fallen short of any 
such expectations (Ministry of Law and Justice 2013). Consequently, 
the Tehelka study raises the question as to when and how, in the 



























a crime? “[F]or a vast majority of men, rape does not even register as 
a violent or heinous crime” writes Chaudhury (2013). The same is of 
course true of many women (confirmed by Shreya Sarawgi, Fellow at 
the Institute for Human Development in Delhi, interviewed on 15 July 
2013). 
 The only situation in which rape would be an offence would be under 
the eyes of the guardian. There is an indication that an awareness of 
the possibility exists that men within the family might be a potential 
threat to the safety of women who at their hands could become victims 
of sexual molestation and even rape.8 This is suggested by the fol-
lowing quote: “In the olden days, our elders had a rule. A grown-up 
daughter would not be allowed to be in the same room as her father or 
her brother” (Vijay Prasad Shetty, 57, president of the Udupi Bar 
Association, cit. in Chaudhury 2013). Again, however, the respon-
sibility to avoid ambiguous situations rests plainly on the female side 
who is to ensure that she leaves the room (or gets up from the bed) so 
as not to tempt the male family member. “As a child I was cautioned 
by my mother to get up from a bed should a male member of the fa-
mily attempt to sit next to me” says Smita Tewari Jassal (CSDS Fellow, 
interviewed on 15 July 2013). “In the olden days, our elders had a rule 
[says Vijay Prasad Shetty, 57, president of Udupi bar association]. A 
grown-up daughter would not be allowed to be in the same room as 
her father or her brother” (cit. in Chaudhury 2013). 
 This raises the question as to whether there are any possible situ-
ations at all where the average male could conceive of forced inter-
course as his own responsibility and as a crime; not in the house, 
because it is either no offence (as in marriage) or avoidable (as under 
guardianship), nor outside the house, because it is unprovided for (as 
under guardianship) or not an offence (because the victim would be to 
blame). In the traditional representation of social order there seems to 
be no room for an offence called rape. Ironically, therefore, RSS-Chief 
Mohan Bhagvat appears to be oddly correct when he states that “rape 
only occurs in India but not in Bharat,”9 – not because there is no 
forced intercourse in Bharat but because Bharat’s social imaginary can-
not conceive of any relevant situation where forced intercourse would 
constitute an offence. 
 In India, in contrast to Bharat, rape is a legal offence. The 
palimpsest-like overwriting of two social scripts, Indian and Bharati, 
evidently has not lead to the complete effacement of Bharati normative 



























ambivalent discourse on Indian public life, where we seem to have two 
competing sets of norms: first, the system of Bharat which hardly 
knows of rape as a crime; second, the system of India where rape 
constitutes a statutory offence. The Indian penal code defines rape as 
sexual intercourse without consent. Court trials therefore revolve 
around the question whether the disputed sexual act occurred with or 
without the consent of the victim. Now the interference of the two 
normative systems, that of Bharat and that of India, can lead to 
grotesque consequences, as the following example will show. 
 In January 1996, a sixteen year old girl from Suryanelli, Kerala, who 
had eloped with her boyfriend, was subsequently deserted by him and 
fell into the hands of a couple who raped, confined and procured her as 
an alleged prostitute to as many as forty other men over a period of 
forty days.10 In 2000 the local Sessions Court sentenced thirty six of 
the men and one woman to various fines and rigorous imprisonment 
for varying terms. In 2005 the Kerala High Court acquitted thirty five 
of the accused citing as the principal reason that it was possible that 
the girl had consented to the repeated intercourse with several men. 
In 2013, this judgment, called ‘shocking’ by the Supreme Court of 
India, was set aside and returned for review to the Kerala High Court. 
On 4 April 2014, a new bench of the Kerala High Court finally sen-
tenced one of the 35 accused to life imprisonment while 22 were 
sentenced to varying terms of rigorous imprisonment. Seven were 
acquitted and five had died during the pendency of trial.11 The bench 
rejected the plea of the accused that the victim was ‘deviant’, and that 
she could have escaped during her captivity. 
 What is so shocking in the first judgment of the Kerala High Court is 
the rationale followed by the judges. Before considering the legally 
relevant facts of the case, the High Court went into an ethical 
assessment of the girl and concluded that she was ‘deviant’ and not ‘a 
normal innocent girl of her age’. By that logic, whether a woman can 
be considered a victim of rape depends on whether she is considered 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ by the standards of Bharati folk ethics. Only ‘good’ 
women can possibly be victims of rape. ‘Bad’ women are considered 
fair game without rights to their bodies, without legal defence, and 
without hope of solidarity from a society that rigorously ostracises 
them and condemns them to ‘social death’. 
 The assumption that the girl could have possibly consented to being 
taken to places unknown to her and to have intercourse with complete 



























resulting in severe physical and psychological injuries, was corro-
borated for the High Court by the fact that presumably she already had 
consented to having pre-marital intercourse with her boyfriend. 
Furthermore, the Kerala High Court decided that the girl was ‘deviant’ 
based on the fact that she had previously ‘squandered’ a couple of 
earrings and the pocket money she received from her parents. This 
understanding of ‘deviance’ prevalent among the judges also prevails 
in the police force: A girl who has consented to having pre-marital 
intercourse with one man is to blame herself if other men take advan-
tage of her ‘promiscuity’ (Balla & Vishnu 2013). 
 By this logic, the fact that a woman has once consented to an act 
immoral in the eyes of society would imply that she has given away 
the right to her integrity once and for all. So, for any further sexual 
intercourse, consent presumably is no longer required. The misgiving 
that this logic seems to govern the minds of large sections of Indian 
society is supported by the fact that the social environment ostracised 
the Suryanelli rape victim to the extent that today she has no one to 
stand by her except for her parents. Everybody else, family and 
friends, have deserted her and nobody speaks to her in town or work-
place. Even the church, of which she and her parents were regular 
members, has denied her access. In effect this implies that women 
considered unethical by the standards of folk ethics have thereby 
forfeited their most basic human rights. 
 The Suryanelli case shows how the social norms of Bharat can 
undercut the legal norms of India even in institutions like High Courts, 
which are meant to uphold Indian constitutional norms of equality. In 
congruence with this tendency is the practice of the ‘two finger test’ 
where a medical doctor inserts two fingers into the vagina of the victim 
to ascertain her virginity. Besides establishing forced intercourse, it is 
often employed to ascertain whether the victim was already “habitua-
ted to sexual intercourse” (Pitre & Lingam 2013). In the case of an 
unmarried girl this would amount to an admission of guilt. “Recently, 
in Bangaluru, a law student [...] was gang raped when she was in a 
lonely spot with a male companion. The doctors who examined her 
were more concerned about the elasticity of her vagina than finding 
forensic evidence of the gruesome crime” (Agnes 2013: 13). Pitre and 
Lingam find that often “[the two-finger test] is considered a proxy 
indicator of the victim’s ‘loose morals’ and [...] often leads to character 
assassination of women in courts” (Pitre & Lingam 2013: 17). After 



























‘zinda laash’ (living corpse). The term is cynically used even by some 
members of parliament (Agnes 2013: 12). 
 The Tehelka surveys add further flesh to the reconstruction of social 
norms governing Indian society. Twenty eight of the thirty five men 
interviewed by the investigative magazine consider it an indirect 
invitation to sexual intercourse when a woman moves about in the city 
without a guardian: “[...] women are somewhat responsible for the 
crimes against them, but ultimately it is actually the responsibility of 
their guardians, parents and husband” (Tabish Darzi, 26, Banker in 
Srinagar, cit. in Chaudhury 2013), or if she wears ‘provocative clo-
thes’, or when she kisses in public: “Why was the girl out at that time 
of night? I heard when she got onto the bus with the man, they started 
kissing. So it’s not the fault of the men who raped her” (Ram Kishen, 
53, farmer from Bhiwani, cit. in Chaudhury 2013). 
 The survey indicates that many men all over India, independent of 
religious affiliation, profession, level of education, age, or regional 
origin, hold women responsible for rapes perpetrated on them. A 
majority of the men interviewed would not consider the possibility of 
the male perpetrator bearing any responsibility: “Hindu, Muslim, or 
Christian. Farmer, labourer, auto driver, scientist, lawyer or teacher. 
Educated or illiterate. Old or young. Haryanvi, UP-wallah, or Southie. 
Only one thing seemed to bind the men Tehelka spoke to: they had no 
concept of male accountability” (Chaudhury 2013). Common to them 
was “a fear and abhorrence of women who display autonomy over 
their own bodies and sexuality ... No culture, profession or age group – 
no level of education or exposure – seems to make men immune to 
this.” (ibid) 
According to these views, women must be kept subordinate to men 
at all times and according to some, this hierarchical relationship may 
be asserted by exemplary acts of violence. In the Delhi gang rape 
case, another aspect of the hierarchical nature of the norms partly 
governing Indian society was evident. In this particular case, the issue 
of gender hierarchy interacts with the issue of caste hierarchy. In parts 
of India, Dalit or Tribal women can be raped with impunity. In the 
most famous such case, the high caste rapists of Bhanwari Devi, a 
social worker and a Dalit, were acquitted by the Trial Court on grounds 
that “upper-caste men could not have raped a Dalit”. Moreover, since 
the rapists included an uncle-nephew pair, the judge insisted that a 
man could not possibly have participated in a gang-rape in the 



























received notions of caste and gender stereotypes prefigure the minds 
of judges who are then incapable of enforcing constitutional norms of 
equality. 
 Even the right to the newly wedded bride (ius primae noctis) is still 
claimed by landlords in some places without arousing concern. “Dalit 
women are raped with impunity as if Dalits were meant to be abused; 
the custom of offering newlywed brides to feudal landlords is still 
practiced in certain pockets” (Teltumbde 2013: 11). “[R]aping dalit or 
tribal women [...] has been a widely prevalent punishment [...] this is 
not [considered] a crime; it is albeit the most legitimate act to ‘show 
them their place’” (Bajpai 2013: 5). When low caste or class men rape 
a girl who has the sympathy of the upper castes and middle classes, it 
is perceived as a provocation by those on top of the established power 
hierarchy. In the Delhi gang rape case, the victim, although from 
economically humble origins, was of high caste as suggests her name 
(confirmed by Arati Kumari, Pondicherry University, interviewed on 7 
October 2013). She successfully aspired to belong to the upwardly 
mobile classes, whereas the perpetrators were all low caste and class 
with little chances for upward mobility. Her suitability as a role model 
for an aspiring, media conversant and internet savvy middle class 
partly explains the huge media response the case elicited while media 
are hardly interested in cases where Dalits, the lowest of the low, are 
the rape victims. 
 In stark contrast, for example, in the Kherlanji case “[i]t took a 
month following an incident of macabre caste violence [...] to burst to 
attention” (Editorial 2006: 4633). For the same reasons, the rape of 
tribal women in the North-East gains media attention only because of 
their large numbers.13 Against this backdrop, the assessment of the 
Delhi gang rape case by prominent intellectuals can be called into 
questioned. They make it seem like modernity and its mega cities were 
the root of the problem, as if rape did not happen in rural India.14 That 
this is not the case is shown in a recent study from Azim Premji 
Universtiy, which clearly could not find a higher incidence of rape in 
urban versus rural areas.15 
Egalitarian Ethics 
Today, some young men in India turn away from received ideas about 
gender roles: “Our rigid and orthodox societal mindset has to go” 
(Tejas Jain, 23, IT engineer and music student from Indore, cit. in 



























independent, economically and in their decisions regarding the way 
they dress, where they go, or with whom they sleep: “A successful 
woman is someone who is truly independent, who can live with her 
family or on her own, take her own decisions, dress as she wants, go 
where she wants and have as many sexual partners as she chooses” 
(Sukalyan Roy, 27, marketing executive in Delhi, paraphrased in 
Chaudhury 2013). In this view, “The emancipation of women is in the 
larger interest of society. They need more freedom, not less” (Abhi-
shek Verma, 25, student of computer science, Ambedkar University, 
Lucknow, cit. in Chaudhury 2013). Emancipation is seen as a positive 
element of modern culture and should therefore be emulated. “The 
protest against rape by common people in Delhi and other places was, 
in fact, a product of modern culture ... Western culture is not just 
about wearing jeans and short skirts (Pramod Kumar, professor of 
history, Lucknow University, cit. in Chaudhury 2013). The relations of 
men and women should be governed by equality and reciprocity: “As 
far as clothes are concerned, if women cannot tell me what to wear, 
how can I dictate terms to them?” (Vipul Patel, 28, electrical goods 
shop owner in Udupi, cit. in Chaudhury 2013). “How can anyone hold 
women responsible for crimes against them? If anyone is responsible, 
it is the men” (Prakash, 35, daily wager and coconut plucker from 
Udupi, cit. in Chaudhury 2013). Thus Chaudhury demands: 
As a modern democracy, the right of the individual – irrespective 
of religion, caste, class or gender – is enshrined in our Constitu-
tion. For a woman, this ought to mean a complete autonomy over 
her body, her choices, her movement and her right to work. 
These choices may be curtailed on the ground by the cultural or 
personal context she inhabits, or where she herself wants to 
stand on the ladder of emancipation. But, in essence, there 
should be no curtailments. (Chaudhury 2013) 
One must note here that men are not the only ones who perpetuate 
traditional gender roles. Women also have a share in the responsibility. 
“I hold women equally responsible as men for the segregated outlook 
of our society that views them as a solitary object for childbearing and 
sexual gratification” (Rak Kumar Singh, documentary filmmaker from 
Manipur, cit. in Chaudhury 2013). 
In the West, people tend to believe that history is on the side of 
progress. The egalitarian discourse is comfortably hegemonic and 
one can laugh about people with traditional hierarchical beliefs, or 
force them to comply, at least outwardly, with egalitarian norms. 
If the same was true in India, Chaudhury writes, it would be 



























of social order. However, the examples cited above lead to the 
apprehension that hierarchical social norms are the rule, not the 
exception in the representations of social order widely upheld in 
Indian society. 
Anti-Hegemonic Strategies 
“And if they are that, how is one to negotiate such a gaping cultural 
divide? How can a society articulate – and enforce – desired values for 
itself if there is such a foundational disagreement over what those 
values should be?” (Chaudhury 2013).  
In India, the hierarchical discourse is hegemonic and it is not 
obvious which side is favoured by the current tide of history. 
Struggling from a minority position requires caution. Some women’s 
rights activists admonish the ‘imperialist vocabulary’ in some of the 
egalitarian critique and point out: “If you treat everyone who does not 
agree with you as aliens and fools, if you refuse to accept them as 
your own people, what gives you the right to dictate to them? What 
makes you think they will even entertain your criticism?” (Madhu 
Kishwar, editor of Manushi and CSDS Fellow, cit. in ibid.). Chaudhury 
describes the difficulties faced by the Indian women’s movement as 
follows: 
To speak of collective outrage is to assume a shared value 
system. Clearly, we don’t have that. The idea of equality may be 
non-negotiable, but the paths to it are many. If we stay commit-
ted [to the process of participatory dialogue], even after the 
clumsy water cannons are gone and the anguished candles have 
died, we might still have one billion rising. (ibid. 2013) 
In her own words, Chaudhury describes what turns out to be a more 
general dilemma with Universalist aspirations of moral philosophy. The 
counterfactual thought experiments used in moral philosophy to 
produce reciprocity under conditions of equality all depend on the 
readiness of those invited to accept reciprocity and equality as a mini-
mal condition for justice. This is clearly not the case in societies with a 
majority of people accepting hierarchy and inequality as principles of 
social order. Even while large numbers indignantly take to the streets 
to demand equality for men and women, the majority of Indian society 
seems to have little use for such ideas. Since rape does not register as 
a crime for many Indians, “it’s possible many […] will read the ex-
cerpts of conversations with Indian men listed in this story and wonder 




























 She also points to the only way out; the emergence of an egalitarian 
consensus through unconstrained participative dialogue and non-
violent political action. Only such means can hope to weaken the he-
gemony of the hierarchical discourse in favour of an egalitarian one; 
though this approach must be taken with moderation. “If the framing 
of this debate gets too vociferous and extreme, it can galvanise the 
opposition in disturbing ways … If one gets too absolutist, the whole 
thing can boomerang.16 
Preconditions for Moral Universalism 
What Chaudhury explains for the Indian context, i.e. the hiatus bet-
ween egalitarian constitutional norms and hierarchical social norms, is 
a fortiori true of moral-philosophical universalism. Among its appli-
cation requirements would have to be a consensus regarding the equal 
worth of every human being simply by virtue of being human. Only 
then can we engage everyone in thought experiments like Rawls’ 
original position or Habermas’ practical discourse. The dilemma of 
moral philosophical universalism can be represented as follows: 
P1: No-one should have to be subject to a normative order to which 
s/he could not have given his/her assent. In his Theory of Public Right 
(öffentliches Recht), Kant speaks of the “lawful freedom [of the citizen] 
to obey no law other than that to which he has given his consent” 
(Kant 1900 VI: 314, my translation). 
P2: There are societies in which the minimal preconditions for uni-
versal justice (recognition of the equal worth of all human beings as 
human beings) are not given. 
D: Universalist moral theories claim to be valid even in societies as in 
P2. However, they could not ensure the minimal preconditions for their 
applicability without violating P1. 
E: Therefore universalism must rely on the emergence of the recogni-
tion of the same dignity of all human beings as human beings, to avoid 
dilemma D. This is exactly what Chaudhury demanded. 
P1 is a premise made by many moral theories in the tradition of Kant, 
e.g. Rawls in the justification of his original position through a “full 
reflective equilibrium” (Rawls 1995: 141, fn. 16), or Habermas in the 
justification of his ideal discourse situation. Habermas’ ‘principle of 
universalisation’ intends to set the conditions for impartial judgement 
insofar as it constrains all affected to adopt the perspectives of all 



























Every valid norm must satisfy the condition that the consequen-
ces and side effects its general observance can be anticipated to 
have for the satisfaction of the interests of each could be freely 
accepted by all affected. (Habermas 2001: 32, emphases in 
original) 
Thus the conditions for the practical discourse, out of which universally 
valid norms may emerge, include the participation and acceptance of 
all who are affected by such norms irrespective of their caste, class or 
gender. But consensus can only be achieved if all participants are 
allowed to participate as equals and all affected can freely accept the 
consequences and the side effects that the general observance of a 
controversial norm can be expected to have. 
 P1 assumes that deontological moral theories need to presuppose 
the effective recognition of the same dignity of all human beings as 
human beings, ‘effective’ meaning that they are recognised at least by 
those parts of society whose discourse exerts hegemony (as “intellect-
tual and moral leadership”, Gramsci 1971: 57) over the rest of society. 
This is at the same time an empirical as well as a meta-ethical condi-
tion. It alone lends plausibility to the assumption that all concerned by 
a certain normative order would be likely to engage in counterfactual 
thought experiments along the lines of Kant, Rawls or Habermas, that 
produce conditions of reciprocity and equality among empirically 
inequitably and unequally positioned individuals. These thought ex-
periments lead to a normative order where social and juridical norms 
pertain to all individuals alike. 
 Such an egalitarian order is obviously very different from one where 
the value of different liberties and the consequences for the breach of 
norms vary due to differences in gender, status, and station, as in the 
erstwhile feudal societies of Europe or India. In Manu’s Law and in 
Kautilya’s Arthashastra for instance, the degree of punishment de-
pends on the caste or gender of the perpetrator and the victim (Bühler 
1886; Shamasastry 1915). Deontological constructivist procedures in 
moral philosophy assume empirically (as ‘accommodating life word’) as 
well as meta-ethically (as readiness to engage in equalising thought 
experiments) the general recognition of the idea of the equal dignity of 
all human beings. This is a prerequisite for engaging in counterfactual 
thought experiments such as a fair original position or an ideal dis-




























 P2 is an empirical premise that this paper attempts to render 
plausible for the case of India. In India, as this paper has tried to 
demonstrate, hierarchical representations of social order prevail over 
egalitarian representations, which are also present in the social imagi-
nary. In the hierarchical imaginary, men and women are not equal for 
principled reasons. Similarly, human beings of different castes and 
casteless Dalits and Adivasis are considered fundamentally unequal.17 
 The conclusion (E) sets its hope in the possible emergence of a wide 
acceptance of human dignity as a feature pertaining to all human 
beings alike and only in virtue of their humanity, i.e. independently of 
ethical merit, social status, caste, class or gender. The emergence of a 
hegemonic discourse of equality would serve as the empirical and 
meta-ethical precondition for the applicability of deontological theories 
of justice. Once its emergence is global, moral universalism becomes 
conceivable. Habermas’ approach aims at the inclusion of ‘all subjects 
capable of speech and action’. It is therefore universal relative to the 
globalised human perspective. 
The horizon of every form of life is fluid, its boundaries per-
meable. There is no absolute barrier to the ‘desire for as much 
intersubjective agreement as possible’. Practical knowledge can 
all the more readily claim to be knowledge the more radically we 
open ourselves to others and expand our local knowledge and 
ethnocentric outlook – indeed, extend our community in a virtual 
manner such that our discourse ultimately includes all subjects 
capable of speech and action. (2001: 124, emphasis in original) 
Unlike Kant, Habermas does not reach out to rational beings as such, 
human or non-human, planetary or extra-planetary. His perspective 
remains internal to our human world. It is cosmopolitan more than it is 
universal in the Kantian sense, and it is historically indeterminate: the 
shrine of universal moral values remains empty, the concept of uni-
versal moral norm vacuous, until humanity has reached its potential to 
form a global practical discourse community. 
 The emergence of an egalitarian discourse receives support from 
parts of the women’s rights movement in India, which take recourse to 
Universalist ideas of equal human rights. They are confronted with 
overpoweringly in-egalitarian notions of social order and are thus 
aware that, from such a vulnerable position they have to engage in 
practical discourse and non-violent political action in order to challenge 
the hegemony of the discourse of hierarchy and to herald the emer-
gence of a more gender just social order in India. At their disposal are 



























tions such as Buddhism, Jainism, Bhakti, Christianity, Islam, Sufism, 
Sikhism and Rationalism (for the latter cf. Quack 2012). Thus Rajeev 
Bhargava asks: 
The Veer Shaivite movement, a strikingly radical movement in 
12th century Karnataka, challenged Braminical and male sup-
remacy, something impossible without the presupposition of 
egalitarian notions. What conception of equality did it embody 
and how different is it from modern conceptions? […] What 
intellectual steps were taken to effect this transition and why 
have we frequently refracted these steps? (Bhargava 2013) 
In modern times Dalits, notably Ambedkar and the Mahar movement, 
have appealed to these Indic traditions. They have however tended to 
help only their particular community, as anthropologist Martin Fuchs 
has pointed out (Fuchs 1999: 168-336). They have therefore not been 
able to displace the notion of a fundamental inequality of human 
beings in Indian society as a whole. Women, however, belong to no 
particular class or community. Theoretically, their movement could be 
all-encompassing and it is therefore the women’s movement that 
would have the greatest potential for a transformation of Indian 
society as a whole. This, however, is an open-ended historical process. 
The outcome of the struggle is open and depends on important ex-
ternal factors, as the journalist and author David Devadas points out: 
We need to investigate the influence of economic contexts on 
social norms. Not all that long ago, women were by and large 
treated as property in Europe too. Universal franchise, equal 
inheritance and other rights, and specific gender rights, all ac-
companied the growth of wealth and the establishment of welfare 
states in which the state took over responsibility for protection, 
provision and shelter instead of community, including religious, 
ethnic and clan. It is only when a woman (or any other weak 
member of society) feels secure that the state will protect her 
that she can dare claim her statutory rights. (David Devadas in 
response to an earlier draft of this paper) 
An important internal factor would be the unity of the women’s 
movement. This is however questionable owing to the divides cutting 
through Indian society along lines of class, caste, and religion, which of 
course also split the women’s movement in many factions. Also in view 
of Indian legal pluralism in family and inheritance law it is doubtful 
whether the required unity can be attained. Indian legal pluralism can 
potentially harm the women’s movement, for it divides women’s rights 
activists into their different religious communities, Hindu, Muslim or 



























Since the Shah Bano affair of the mid-1980s, the unified civil code 
(UCC) has ceased to be a goal shared by many women’s rights acti-
vists (Agnes 2012). Because the Hindu right in 1986 had appropriated 
the demand for a UCC, liberal and leftist women’s rights activists 
feared that they would become indistinguishable from right-wing forces 
if they continued to struggle for the same. Since then, most women’s 
rights activists work from within their respective communities and so 
follow different agendas.18 As the Indian women’s movement shied 
away from pressing for a uniform civil code since this had become a 
right wing position, the question arises to what extent the acceptance 
of community-based inequalities puts the movement in the same space 
as the reactionaries of another ilk who hold on to community based 
hierarchical norms. 
 What form should the practical discourse challenging the hegemony 
of hierarchy over equality take to be effective? The problem is that 
equality is itself a contested notion in feminist discourses. Feminists 
criticize the methodological individualism in the liberal notion of 
citizenship which renders the individual a human being without proper-
ties (Butler et al. 2000: 11-43, 40-41, 136-81). But they also remind 
us of the emancipative side to the idea of equal citizenship. Thus, 
Nivedita Menon writes: “Justice is seen to be ensured by the winning, 
granting and protection of rights which are held by the citizen. This 
citizen is unmarked by any other identifying markers than that of 
‘citizen’ itself – this is precisely what is supposed to give the category 
the potential to ensure justice” (Menon 1998: PE-4). Thus, the same 
property, being blind to individual differences, on one hand lends 
‘justice’ to the concept of citizenship because it abolishes hierarchy; on 
the other hand, however, this blindness renders it insensitive for 
considerations of individual circumstances and thereby ‘inequitable’. 
 While in theory all citizens are equal before the law, in practice large 
parts of the population are disadvantaged due to their religion, caste, 
class or gender. Therefore, some feminists draw the conclusion that 
disadvantaged groups should struggle separately for their interests. 
Since their discrimination went unnoticed under the regime of un-
marked citizenship, they went for demanding official recognition for 
their collective rights and quota for the representation of women (see 
for example the debate on the Women’s Reservation Bill in Menon 
2010: 3835-44). This corresponds to a general trend in India of tribal 
and caste groups demanding collective rights for themselves on a 
communal basis. They all demand “the right to difference as an in-



























 In her critique of formal equality, Nivedita Menon draws on Ari-
stotle’s maxim that justice consists in treating equals equally and 
unequals unequally. “Quarrels and complaints arise”, writes Aristotle, 
“either when equals receive unequal shares in an allocation, or 
unequals receive equal shares” (Aristotle 2000: 86). At this juncture, 
however, the discussion reaches an aporia: While the status of 
undifferentiated citizenship in practice does not prevent discrimination, 
institutionalised inequality invites outright discrimination. The differen-
ces communities claim for themselves often consist precisely in the 
way communities treat their members unequally. Often the same right 
to difference that communities demand of the Indian state is denied by 
dominant members of those communities to other members, especially 
women (Menon 1998: PE-7). Thereby the community’s right to be 
different turns out to be a right of the community to treat ‘their’ 
women differently and to exert power over them. 
 Where the preoccupation of a community with their difference is first 
and foremost a preoccupation with the gender roles of their members, 
the question arises why Indian feminists should not shun the notion of 
‘community’ as an irreparably patriarchal notion. One may legitimately 
ask to what extent acceptance of community-based inequality put 
feminists in the same space as the reactionaries of those communities. 
Instead, if the women’s movement were to overcome the many divi-
sions fracturing Indian society, if they were to create and agitate the 
unmarked woman citizen, it might be powerful enough to overcome 
patriarchy in India.19 
 In the absence of any state provided social security, however, the 
community remains the prime guarantor of livelihood and cannot easily 
be dismissed. Additionally, the community may be a space within 
which equality may have a greater chance to overcome hierarchy than 
between communities. Egalitarian principles may prevail in insular 
form among individuals within the same caste, age and gender 
community. Ernst Tugendhat (Willaschek 1997) has pointed to the fact 
that these islands of equality never seem in need of justification. He 
concludes that the onus of proof is therefore on the defenders of 
inequality, which offers at least a slight argumentative advantage to 
the defenders of equality. 
 As mentioned at the outset of this paper, Jaeggi (2014: 261) 
distinguishes three forms of critique (external, internal and immanent) 
that may be useful in probing into the ambivalences and contradictions 



























given life-form with reference to demands that go beyond the prin-
ciples inherent in this life-form or which question the life-form al-
together. The external critique does not share with the participants of 
a life-form their commitment to its inherent norms. Internal critique, 
by contrast, uses demands and norms already inherent in a life-form 
to criticise an eventual lack of compliance (ibid. 263). Internal critique 
does not aim for the reform or fundamental change of a life-form or for 
the establishment of a new social order. Instead it aims at the re-
covery or re-establishment of those already accepted norms that it 
perceives as having come into misuse or oblivion (ibid. 265). It is clear 
that the Indian feminist critique is neither external nor internal in this 
sense. 
 Immanent critique in contrast “assumes that the contexts from 
which it derives its standards are contradictory in themselves. There-
fore, it is no accident that these standards are not realised for they are 
marred with a systematic problem” (Jaeggi 2014: 277, my trans-
lation). As we have seen, feminist critique in India exposes the inner 
contradiction of a life-form in crisis that is wedded to two incompatible 
representations of normative order, one egalitarian and one hierar-
chical. Often, however, it gets itself entangled in these contradictions. 
According to Jaeggi, the systematic problem inherent in an established 
practice reveals itself only through theoretic reflection (2014: 278). 
The internal contradictions of a life-form in crisis need to be analysed 
and understood by the critique using only those resources that are 
available with the ‘material’ provided within the life-form itself. Imma-
nent critique thereby gains an exemplary role for the participants of 
the life-form in crisis. It demonstrates how any such participant can 
move from A to B without requiring resources other than those avai-
lable to all. 
 Moreover, according to Jaeggi, the analysis of the crisis as rooted in 
an internal contradiction of a life-form needs to point out the cons-
titutive character of this contradiction for the life-form in question. 
Mutually incompatible demands or norms are not by chance integrated 
in the same life-form and cause its tension; this tension plays an 
instrumental role in the very constitution of the life-form. Here Jaeggi 
draws on Hegel for whom modern life is marred by the contradiction of 
emphasising individual autonomy and setting the individual free from 
traditional communal bindings while at the same time increasing the 
dependency of the individual on an ever more tightly integrated society 




























The Hegelian trope of a tragic entrapment, where all sides want only 
well, but produce only disaster, may not be a suitable template to 
follow in every analysis of life-forms in crisis. There is however a tragic 
element in the entanglement of feminist critique in the contradictions 
of Indian life. Feminist critique in India seems to be undecided whether 
wholeheartedly to embrace the egalitarianism and normative indivi-
duallism expressed in the Indian constitution with its notion of equal 
(unmarked) citizenship, or to reinforce the communitarianism and sec-
tarianism ubiquitous at all levels of Indian society by conceptualising it 
in terms of differentiated citizenship. The desire seems to be somehow 
to marry the two so as to have the cake and eat it. The question 
before the immanent critique, however, seems to be whether this 
fundamental contradiction between the egalitarianism of unmarked 
citizenship and the communitarianism of differentiated citizenship is 
not very much at the root of the gender-crisis in Indian society. 
 Stopping short of making this contradiction constitutive for Indian 
society, as Jaeggi’s concept of immanent critique would demand, it 
seems nevertheless fundamental in the sense that it is indicative of the 
ambivalent role of the postcolonial state. The relatively weak state is 
not in a position to enforce its monopoly of power (and the rule of law) 
over and above the various entities out of which it is composed 
(regional powers, religious communities, caste communities, tribal 
communities etc.). The inability of the Indian state to consistently 
enforce constitutional law as against common or customary law leads 
to a lack of capacity to deliver justice and social security for the indivi-
dual, which in turn strengthens the community as the guarantor of 
parallel jurisprudence and rudimentary social security. Communal 
paralegal institutions, however, lack an organised from. Their only way 
of delivering justice is by way of exemplary violence as a deterrent to 
those who violate the traditional hierarchical order that persists 
between religious, caste, and tribal communities and, within each of 
them, between genders. 
 Thus the analyst and immanent critique has to make a choice 
either to strengthen the centre, its monopoly of force, and its exclusive 
right to determine what counts as law, or to strengthen the com-
munities as guarantors of rudimentary social security, identity and 
belonging. The communities, however, in their hierarchical, caste- and 
gender-biased ways, will always be at odds with the egalitarian project 



























be avoided, but of course a true Hegelian would tend towards the 
sublation of the two conflicting tendencies into a single synthesising 
framework.
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